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Abstract
We propose a methodology for estimating the competition e¤ects from entry when
rms sell di¤erentiated products. We rst derive precise conditions under which Bres-
nahan and Reissentry threshold ratios (ETRs) can be used to test for the presence
and to measure the magnitude of competition e¤ects. We then show how to augment
the traditional entry model with a revenue equation. This revenue equation serves to
adjust the ETRs by the extent of market expansion from entry, and leads to unbi-
ased estimates of the competition e¤ects from entry. We apply our approach to seven
di¤erent local service sectors. We nd that entry typically leads to signicant market
expansion, implying that traditional ETRs may substantially underestimate the com-
petition e¤ects from entry. In most sectors, the second entrant reduces markups by
at least 30%, whereas the third or subsequent entrants have smaller or insignicant
e¤ects. In one sector, we nd that even the second entrant does not reduce markups,
consistent with a recent decision by the competition authority.
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1 Introduction
An important question in industrial organization is how market structure a¤ects the inten-
sity of competition. To address this question a variety of empirical approaches have been
developed, each with di¤erent strengths and weaknesses depending on the available data.1
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) developed an innovative approach applicable to local service
sectors: they infer the e¤ects of entry on competition from the relationship between the
number of entrants and market size. The intuition of their approach is simple. If market size
has to increase disproportionately to support additional rms, entry can be interpreted to
intensify the degree of competition. Conversely, if market size increases proportionally with
the number of rms, then additional entry is interpreted to leave the degree of competition
una¤ected. To implement their approach, Bresnahan and Reiss propose the concept of the
entry threshold ratio (henceforth ETR). The ETR is the percentage per-rm market size
increase that is required to support an additional rm. An estimated ETR greater than 1
indicates that entry leads to stronger competition, whereas an ETR equal to 1 indicates that
entry does not intensify competition.
A major strength of Bresnahan and Reissmethodology is that it can be applied with
relatively modest data requirements. One basically needs data on a cross-section of local
markets, with information on the number of rms per market, population size and other
market demographics as control variables. No information on prices or marginal costs is
required. This also makes their approach potentially appealing from a competition policy
perspective. It can be used as a rst monitoring tool to assess which sectors potentially face
competition problems and require more detailed investigation.
A central assumption of Bresnahan and Reissmethodology is that rms produce ho-
mogeneous products: holding prices constant, an additional entrant only leads to business
stealing and does not create market expansion. This assumption is potentially problem-
atic since new entrants may be di¤erentiated from existing rms, either because they o¤er
di¤erent product attributes or because they are located at a di¤erent place. In both cases,
additional entry would raise demand (holding prices constant).
In this paper we develop a more general economic model to assess the competition e¤ects
from entry. The model allows for the possibility that rms sell di¤erentiated products, i.e.
additional entry can create market expansion. We rst derive precise conditions under which
Bresnahan and ReissETRs can be used as a test for the presence of competition e¤ects
from entry. We nd that this is only possible if products are homogeneous, i.e. additional
1For detailed overviews see, for example, Bresnahan (1989), Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry and Pakes (2007)
and Reiss and Wolak (2007).
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entry only entails business stealing and no market expansion. We then ask when ETRs can
be used as a measure for the magnitude of competition entry e¤ects. We show that ETRs
are generally a biased measure for the percentage markup e¤ect due to entry, except in the
special case where products are homogeneous and the price elasticity of market demand
is unity. More generally, if products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, ETRs typically tend to
underestimate the percentage markup e¤ects from competition.
Our theoretical framework also provides a natural way to extend the Bresnahan and
Reissapproach to obtain an unbiased measure for the magnitude of the markup e¤ects due
to entry. We propose to augment the traditional ordered probit entry model with a revenue
equation. The entry model species the equilibrium number of rms that can be sustained
under free entry. The revenue equation species per rm revenues as a function of the number
of rms and enables one to estimate the total market expansion e¤ects (consisting of both
the direct e¤ects from increased product di¤erentiation and any indirect e¤ects through
possible price changes). To obtain an unbiased estimate of the markup e¤ects from entry,
the traditional ETRs from the entry model should be suitably adjusted by the total market
expansion e¤ects estimated from the revenue equation.
To implement our approach, we study a variety of local service sectors, for which rev-
enue data are increasingly becoming available.2 More specically, we consider architects,
bakeries, butchers, orists, plumbers, real estate agents and restaurants. For each sector, we
constructed a cross-section dataset of local markets (towns) in Belgium, with information
on market revenues, the number of entrants, market size (population) and market demo-
graphics. Estimating the single-equation entry model yields the traditional ETRs, and we
estimate these to be close to 1. This would seem to indicate that entry does not lead to
intensied competition. In fact, we even estimate some ETRs to be below 1, which would
be inconsistent with the hypothesis of increased competition. However, estimation of the
revenue equation shows that entry may often lead to important total market expansion, es-
pecially for architects, orists and real estate agents. This implies that the traditional ETRs
underestimate the competition e¤ects from entry. Accounting for the estimated total market
expansion e¤ects leads to stronger competition e¤ects, especially from the second entrant.
Third and subsequent entrants have more limited or insignicant competition e¤ects. In one
2The increased access to revenue data has recently also been exploited in a variety of other settings.
For example, Syverson (2004) uses plant-level revenue data in the ready-mixed concrete industry, to assess
how demand factors a¤ect the distribution of productivity. Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) consider the
relationship between market size and the size distribution of establishments. They nd that establishments
tend to be larger in large markets, consistent with models of large-group competition. Konings, Van Cayseele
and Warzynski (2005) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2010) extend Halls (1988) approach to estimate
markups using plant-level data on revenues in combination with variable input expenditures.
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sector, bakeries, we nd no signicant competition e¤ects, not even from the second entrant.
Incidentally, this sector has recently been investigated by the local competition authority
because of price xing concerns.
Our paper relates to the growing empirical literature on static entry models. Bresnahan
and Reiss (1991) proposed their ordered probit model of free entry to infer competition e¤ects
from entry by doctors, dentists, car dealers and plumbers. Asplund and Sandin (1999) and
Manuszak (2002) are examples of applications of this model to other sectors. Berry (1992)
considered a more general model of entry with heterogeneous rms. Mazzeo (2002), Seim
(2006) and Schaumans and Verboven (2008) allow for multiple types of rms or endogenize
the choice of type. Other recent work on static entry models has focused on di¤erent ways
of addressing the multiplicity problem in entry games with rm heterogeneity; see Berry and
Reiss (2007) for a recent overview of the literature. In contrast with this recent literature,
we maintain the basic entry model that can be applied to market-level data and we focus
on the interpretation of ETRs. We show how to augment the entry model with a revenue
equation to draw more reliable inferences about the competition e¤ects from entry.
Section 2 presents the theoretical framework, showing under which conditions ETRs can
be used as a test for the presence and a measure for the magnitude of competition e¤ects.
Section 3 presents the econometric model and Section 4 the empirical analysis. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
We rst describe the model. We then introduce the concept of the ETR, and derive conditions
under which ETRs can be used to test for the presence of competition e¤ects from entry.
Finally, we show how to incorporate revenue data to adjust ETRs to measure the magnitude
of competition e¤ects from entry in an unbiased way.
2.1 The model
There are N rms, competing in a local market with a population size S. Each rm has the
same constant marginal cost c > 0 and incurs a xed cost f > 0 (independent of the number
of rms).
Demand Firms do not necessarily produce homogeneous products, but in equilibrium
they charge the same industry price p. The demand per rm and per capita as a func-
tion of this common price p and the number of rms N is q(p;N). This is the traditional
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Chamberlinian DD curve (in per capita terms). Similarly, industry demand per capita is
Q(p;N) = q(p;N)N . Denote the price elasticity of industry demand by " =  Qp pQ =  qp pq .
We ignore the fact that N can only take integer values here, but we take this into account
in the empirical analysis.
We make the following three assumptions about demand.
Assumption 1 qp  0, or equivalently, Qp = qpN  0:
Assumption 2 qN  0:
Assumption 3 QN = q + qNN  0:
The rst assumption simply says that per-rm or industry demand is weakly decreasing
in the common industry price p. The second assumption says that per-rm demand is
weakly decreasing in the number of rms N : holding prices constant, additional entry either
leads to business stealing (if products are substitutes) or does not a¤ect per-rm demand
(if products are independent). Finally, the third assumption says that industry demand
is weakly increasing in N : holding prices constant, entry either leads to market expansion
because of product di¤erentiation, or leaves industry demand una¤ected if products are
homogeneous.
These assumptions clearly cover the special case in which products are homogeneous, as
in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). In this case, industry demand per capita can be written as
Q(p;N) = D(p), so that q(p;N) = D(p)
N
. It immediately follows that qN =  q=N < 0 and
QN = q + qNN = 0. Hence, with homogeneous products entry leads to full business stealing
and no market expansion (holding prices constant).
More generally, the assumptions allow for product di¤erentiation with symmetric rms.
To illustrate, consider Berry and Waldfogels (1999) symmetric nested logit model used to
study product variety: the rst nest includes all rmsproducts, and the second nest contains
the outside good or no-purchase alternative. With identical rms and identical prices, the
nested logit per rm and per capita demand function is:
q(p;N) =
N 
ep +N1 
;
where  > 0 is the price parameter and 0    1 is the nesting parameter. It can easily be
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veried that:
qp =  (1 Nq) < 0
qN =   ( + (1  )q) q
N
< 0
QN = (1  )q(1  q)  0:
If  = 1, then qN =  q=N and QN = 0, so all rmsproducts are perceived as homogeneous
(relative to the outside good).
Prots and prices Now consider prots and the symmetric equilibrium price in the mar-
ket. For a common industry price p a rms prots are
 = (p  c) q(p;N)S   f:
Suppose rst that all N rms behave as a cartel. In this case, the equilibrium price as a
function of N is pm(N), dened by the rst-order condition
q(p;N) + (p  c) qp(p;N) = 0:
More generally, let the symmetric equilibrium price as a function of the number of rms N
be given by p(N)  pm(N). In many oligopoly models, including the Cournot and Bertrand
models, this equilibrium price is weakly decreasing in N , p0  0. We can then write a rms
equilibrium prots as a function of the number of rms N as:
(N) = (p(N)  c) q(p(N); N)S   f: (1)
In the next two subsections we will decompose prots in two di¤erent ways. Dene the
variable prots per rm and per capita by v(N)  (p(N)  c) q(p(N); N), the revenues per
rm and per capita by r(N)  p(N)q(p(N); N), and the Lerner index or percentage markup
by (N)  p(N) c
p(N)
. We can then write
(N) = v(N)S   f: (2)
= (N)r(N)S   f: (3)
The expression on the rst line contains variable prots per rm and per capita, similar
to Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). The expression on the second line rewrites variable prots
as markups times revenue per rm and per capita. As we will show in the next two subsec-
tions, this second expression provides useful additional information to assess the e¤ects of
competition on markups, provided that data on revenues are available.
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2.2 ETRs to test for the presence of competition e¤ects
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) introduce the concept of the entry threshold and entry threshold
ratio as a test for the presence of competition e¤ects from entry. The entry threshold is the
critical market size required to support a given number of rms, and is derived from the
zero-prot condition (N) = 0. Using (2), this gives
S =
f
v(N)
 S(N):
Bresnahan and Reiss argue that entry does not lead to increased competition if the entry
threshold increases proportionally with the number of rms. For example, entry would not
lead to more competition if a doubling of the market size is required to support twice as
many rms. Conversely, entry creates intensied competition if the entry threshold increases
disproportionately with the number of rms. For example, competition intensies if a tripling
of the market size would be required to support twice as many rms.
Based on this intuition, Bresnahan and Reiss propose the entry threshold ratio, or ETR,
as a unit-free measure to test for the presence of competition e¤ects. The ETR is dened
as the per-rm entry threshold required to support N rms, relative to the per-rm entry
threshold to support N   1 rms, i.e.
ETR(N)  S(N)=N
S(N   1)=(N   1) : (4)
One can then test the null hypothesis, ETR(N) = 1, that the N -th entrant does not lead to
more competition.
We now assess this interpretation formally, starting from our more general model where
products are not necessarily homogeneous, i.e. allowing for market expansion upon entry.
Substituting S(N)  f
v(N)
in (4), we can write the ETR in a simple form:
ETR(N) =
v(N   1)(N   1)
v(N)N
 V (N   1)
V (N)
: (5)
where V (N) = v(N)N is per capita industry variable prots. The ETR is therefore just the
ratio of industry variable prots with N and N   1 rms.
It follows immediately from (5) that the ETR(N) > 1 if and only if V 0(N) < 0, i.e.
if and only if industry variable prots are strictly decreasing in N . To see under which
circumstances this is the case, di¤erentiate V (N) = v(N)N using (1), and rearrange to
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obtain
V 0 = (q + (p  c)qp) p0N + (p  c) (q + qNN)
= (1  ") p0Nq + (p  c) (q + qNN) : (6)
Suppose rst that products are homogeneous, which is the special case considered by
Bresnahan and Reiss. In this case, q + qNN = 0 so that the second term in (6) vanishes.
Since 1   "  0, it follows that V 0 < 0 (and hence ETR(N) > 1) if and only if p0 < 0.
Similarly, V 0 = 0 if and only if p0 = 0. We can therefore conrm, and make more precise,
Bresnahan and Reissjustication for using ETRs as a test for the presence of competition
e¤ects from entry, when products are homogeneous:
Proposition 1 Suppose that products are homogenous. ETR(N) > 1 if and only if entry
leads to a price decrease ( p0 < 0). ETR(N) = 1 if and only if entry does not a¤ect the price
( p0 = 0).
Bresnahan and Reiss also provide examples from oligopoly models to argue that the ETRs
are declining in N . Intuitively, entry may be expected to have larger e¤ects on competition
if one starts o¤ from few rms with strong market power, as can be conrmed from examples
such as the Cournot model. Formally, it follows from (5) that the ETRs are declining if and
only if the industry variable prots are convex in N , V 00 > 0. While this may often be the
case, it is not generally true, not even if products are homogeneous. A simple counterexample
is a repeated game with price setting rms: prots are monopoly prots for su¢ ciently low
N , and then drop to zero above a critical level for N .3
Suppose now that products are di¤erentiated. This means that additional entry implies
market expansion (holding prices constant), i.e. q + qNN > 0, so that the second term
in (6) becomes positive. It follows immediately that V 0 > 0 (and hence ETR(N) < 1) if
p0 = 0. Furthermore, V 0 > 0 is also possible if p0 < 0, provided products are su¢ ciently
di¤erentiated (since then p approaches pm or  approaches 1=", so that the rst term in (6)
vanishes and the second term dominates). We can conclude the following about the use of
entry thresholds when products are di¤erentiated:
Proposition 2 Suppose products are di¤erentiated. ETR(N) < 1 if entry does not a¤ect
the price ( p0 = 0) or even if entry leads to a price decrease ( p0 < 0) provided products are
3In fact, with homogeneous products one can verify that for small N the function V is concave (V 00 < 0),
while for su¢ ciently large N the function V is convex. In a linear demand Cournot model, the function is
convex for N  2. So ETRs appear to be increasing for N very small. Yet accounting for the fact that N is
an integer, the ETR already drops when moving from 1 to 2 rms.
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su¢ ciently di¤erentiated.
Product di¤erentiation can thus explain occasional ndings in applied work of ETRs less
than 1. (For example, Bresnahan and Reiss report ETR(3) = 0:79 for dentists.) Intuitively,
if entry leads to substantial market expansion and does not intensify competition by very
much, it is possible that market size increases less than proportionately with the number of
rms.
To summarize, Propositions 1 and 2 identify conditions under which the null hypothesis
ETR(N) = 1 is reasonable as a test for the presence of competition e¤ects. It turns out
that this approach is reasonable only if products are homogeneous, but not more generally
if products are di¤erentiated.
2.3 ETRs to measure the magnitude of competition e¤ects
Having identied conditions under which ETRs form a reasonable basis to test for the pres-
ence of the competition e¤ects from entry, we now ask under which conditions ETRs provide
an unbiased measure for the magnitude of the competition e¤ects. Dene this magnitude as
the percentage drop in the Lerner index, (N   1)=(N).
To address this question, we now start from (3) instead of (2) to rewrite the entry
threshold as
S(N) =
f
(N)r(N)
:
This can be substituted in the denition of the ETR (4) to rewrite it as:
ETR(N) =
(N   1)
(N)
r(N   1)(N   1)
r(N)N
 (N   1)
(N)
R(N   1)
R(N)
(7)
where R(N) = r(N)N is the per capita industry revenue function.
It immediately follows that the ETR is an exact measure for the magnitude of the per-
centage markup drop if and only if industry revenues do not vary with the number of rms,
R(N) = R(N   1), i.e. if and only if R0 = 0 (ignoring that N only takes integer values).
Similarly, the ETR underestimates (overestimates) the percentage markup drop if and only
if R0 > 0 (R0 < 0). To see when this is the case, use R(N) = p(N)q(p(N); N)N to compute
R0 = (q + pqp) p0N + p (q + qNN)
= (1  ") p0Nq + p (q + qNN) : (8)
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As before, suppose rst that the products are homogeneous, as in Bresnahan and Reiss.
We have that q + qNN = 0, so that the second term in (8) vanishes. For p0 < 0, we then
obtain that R0 < 0 if " < 1, R0 = 0 if " = 1 and R0 > 0 if " > 1. We can conclude the
following:
Proposition 3 Suppose that products are homogeneous. The ETR is a correct measure of
the percentage markup drop due to entry, ETR(N) = (N   1)=(N), if and only if " = 1.
It underestimates (overestimates) the percentage markup drop if and only if " > 1 ( " < 1 ).
For example, consider an estimated ETR = 1:3, as roughly found for entry by the second
and third rm in Manuszaks study of the 19th century U.S. brewery industry. Assuming
homogeneous products, this can be interpreted as a markup drop by 30% following the
introduction of a second and third competitor, if and only if the price elasticity of market
demand is unity.
Proposition 3 shows that it is di¢ cult to draw general conclusions about the direction
of bias, since one needs to know the level of the price elasticity of industry demand. But
the direction of bias is clear in the special case where industry behaves close to a perfect
cartel. In this case, we have that " > 1 (since marginal cost c > 0). Hence, if the industry
behaves close to a perfect cartel, the entry threshold would underestimate the magnitude of
the markup drop following entry.
Now suppose that products are di¤erentiated, q + NqN > 0. The second term in (8)
is then positive, so that the ETR is more likely to underestimate the markup drop. More
precisely, dene " as the critical elasticity such that R0 = 0, i.e.
"  1 + q + qNN
p0Nq=p
For q+qNN > 0 and p0 < 0, we have that " < 1, so that the ETR would also underestimate
the markup drop for an elasticity below 1 but su¢ ciently close to 1. More precisely, we have:
Proposition 4 Suppose products are di¤erentiated. The ETR underestimates (overesti-
mates) the percentage markup drop (N   1)=(N) if and only if " > " ( " < "), where
" < 1.
To summarize, Propositions 3 and 4 imply that the ETR is more likely to underestimate
the percentage markup drop from entry if the industry behaves close to a cartel (so that
" > 1) and/or if products are strongly di¤erentiated (substantial market expansion from
entry).
9
To obtain this conclusion we made use of the (per capita) industry revenue function.
Provided that revenue data are available, it also suggests a natural way to obtain an unbiased
measure of the competition e¤ect from entry. Indeed, using (7) we can write the percentage
markup drop as
(N   1)
(N)
= ETR(N)
R(N)
R(N   1) :
The markup drop due to entry is thus equal to Bresnahan and ReissETR, multiplied by the
percentage industry revenue e¤ects from entry. In the next section, we develop an empirical
model that augments the traditional entry model with a revenue function. This leads to the
adjusted ETRas an unbiased estimate of the competition e¤ects from entry. The approach
requires market-level revenue data, in addition to data on the number of entrants and market
demographics used in standard entry models.
Remark: absolute margins The above discussion focused on how to obtain an unbiased
measure for the magnitude of the competition e¤ect from entry as dened by percentage
drop in the Lerner index (or percentage margin), (N   1)=(N). One may also ask this
question for the percentage drop in the absolute margin, (p(N   1)  c) = (p(N)  c).4 One
can easily verify that (7) can be rewritten as
ETR(N) =
p(N   1)  c
p(N)  c
Q(N   1)
Q(N)
:
The bias of the ETR as a competition measure now depends on the reduced form demand
function Q(N) instead of the reduced form revenue function R(N). The ETR is an unbiased
measure of the percentage drop in absolute margins if and only if Q0 = 0. Similarly, the
ETR underestimates (overestimates) the percentage drop in absolute margins if and only if
Q0 > 0 (Q0 < 0). We can use Q(N) = q(p(N); N)N to compute
Q0 =  "p0Nq=p+ (q + qNN) :
The counterparts of Proposition 3 and 4 are simple. The ETR is an unbiased estimated
of the percentage drop in absolute margins only if products are homogeneous (q+ qNN = 0)
and demand is perfectly inelastic (" = 0). If either condition is violated, we have Q0 > 0, so
that the ETR will generally underestimate the percentage drop in absolute margins.
This discussion also shows that the appropriate measure of competition depends on data
availability. With revenue data (as in most application) it is natural to focus on the per-
centage drop in the Lerner index (N). With quantity data it is natural to focus on the
percentage drop in the absolute margin p(N)  c.
4We thank Johan Stennek for suggesting us to also look at this measure.
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3 Econometric model
We rst specify a standard empirical entry model without revenue data in the spirit of
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). We show how to estimate this model and compute ETRs,
based on a dataset with the number of rms and market characteristics for a cross-section
of local markets. We then show how to extend the standard entry model with a revenue
equation, and how to compute adjusted ETRs as an unbiased measure of competition e¤ects
from entry.
In both cases the empirical entry model assumes that rm prots are an unobserved,
latent variable. But bounds can be inferred based on the assumption that there is free entry,
i.e. rms enter if and only if this is protable.
3.1 Simple entry model
If revenue data are not available, we start from the prot function (2)
(N) = v(N)S   f;
where v0 < 0. Both the (per capita) variable prots and the xed costs component are
unobserved. However, bounds can be inferred based on the assumption that there is free
entry. Upon observing N rms, we can infer that N rms are protable, whereas N + 1
rms are not:
v(N + 1)S   f < 0 < v(N)S   f;
or equivalently
ln
v(N + 1)
f
+ lnS < 0 < ln
v(N)
f
+ lnS: (9)
Consider the following logarithmic specication for the ratio of variable prots over xed
costs
ln
v(N)
f
= X+ N   !; (10)
where X is a vector of observable market characteristics X, N represents the xed e¤ect of
N rms, and ! is an unobserved error term.5 Assume that N+1 < N < : : :, i.e. additional
rms reduce the variable prots over xed cost ratio (because of reduced demand and/or
reduced markup). We can write the entry conditions as
X+ N+1 + lnS < ! < X+ N + lnS:
5To avoid possible confusion, in the empirical specication we use the subscript N to denote the xed
e¤ect for the N -th rm (as in N ). This di¤ers from the previous section where we used the subscript N for
the partial derivative with respect to N (as in qN ).
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Estimation To estimate the model by maximum likelihood, assume ! is normally distrib-
uted N (0; ). The probability of observing N rms is
P (N) = 

X+ lnS + N


  

X+ lnS + N+1


: (11)
This is a standard ordered probit model, where the N are the cut-pointsor entry e¤ects.
Note that the variance is identied because of the assumption that variable prots increase
proportionally with market size S.6 See Berry and Reiss (2008) for a more general discussion
on identication in entry models.
Constructing ETRs Based on the estimated parameters one can compute the entry
threshold, i.e. the critical market size to support N rms. Using (9) and (10), evaluated
at ! = 0, the entry threshold to support N rms is
S(N) = exp ( X  N) : (12)
The ETR is the ratio of the per-rm market size to support N versus N   1 rms. Using
(4), this is
ETR(N) = exp (N 1   N) N   1
N
: (13)
So in our logarithmic specication the ETRs only depend on the di¤erences in the consecutive
cut-pointsof the ordered probit model; they do not depend on the market characteristics
X.
As shown in the previous section, the ETRs are no good measure of the competitive e¤ects
from entry if products are di¤erentiated. Furthermore, even if products are homogenous,
ETRs can only be used to test the null hypothesis of no competition e¤ects, but not to
measure the magnitude of the competition e¤ects. These considerations motivate augmenting
the entry model to include revenue data in the analysis. We turn to this next.
3.2 Simultaneous entry and revenue model
If we observe revenues per rm and per capita r = r(N), we can disentangle the variable
prots per capita into a percentage markup and a revenue component, v(N) = (N)r(N).
We can then start from the prot function (3):
(N) = (N)r(N)S   f;
6Our specication di¤ers from Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and more closely resembles Genesove (2000).
In contrast with Bresnahan and Reiss, our specication only identies the ratio of variable prots over xed
costs and not the levels. However, we also identify the variance of the error term.
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Upon observing N rms, we can now infer that
(N + 1)r(N + 1)S   f < 0 < (N)r(N)S   f;
or equivalently
ln
(N + 1)
f
+ ln r(N + 1) + lnS < 0 < ln
(N)
f
+ ln r(N) + lnS: (14)
This again gives rise to the ordered probit model. But since we observe per-rm revenues
r = r(N), we can separately specify an equation for revenues and markups (rather than only
for variable prots).
We specify revenues per capita to depend on observed market characteristics X, the
number of rms N and an unobserved market-specic error term . We consider both a
constant elasticity and a xed e¤ects specication:
ln r = ln r(N) = X +  lnN +  (15)
ln r = ln r(N) = X + N +  (16)
where X are observed market demographics  is an unobserved error term a¤ecting revenues,
 is the (constant) elasticity of per-rm revenues r with respect to N , and N are xed entry
e¤ects.
To interpret the e¤ect of N on r, one should bear in mind that r(N)  p(N)q(p(N); N).
Hence, the elasticity  or the xed e¤ects N capture both the direct e¤ect through increased
product di¤erentiation and the indirect e¤ect through a possible price change. More formally,
using (8) we can write the elasticity of r with respect to N as:
r0
N
r
= (1  ") p0N
p
+ qN
N
q
:
The second term qN(N=q) is the direct e¤ect through increased product di¤erentiation. By
assumptions 2 and 3, qN(N=q) 2 ( 1; 0): if qN(N=q) =  1, products are homogeneous and
there is only business stealing. If qN(N=q) = 0, products are independent and there is only
market expansion. The rst term is the indirect e¤ect through a possible price change. If
the rst term is small (because of a modest price e¤ect p0(N=p) and " relatively close to
1), then we can interpret our estimate of r0(N=r) as the extent of business stealing versus
market expansion. For example, in the constant elasticity specication, an estimate of  close
to 1 would indicate that entry mainly involves business stealing (homogeneous products),
and  close to 0 would indicate that entry mainly involves market expansion (independent
products). It will be convenient to follow this interpretation when discussing the empirical
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results. However, we stress that this interpretation only holds approximately, since  also
captures indirect revenue e¤ects through price changes.
Next, we specify the ratio of markups over xed costs as a function of observed market
characteristics X, the number of rms and an unobserved market-specic error term :
ln
(N)
f
= X + N   : (17)
where N > N+1 > : : :, i.e. markups are decreasing in the number of rms.
Substituting the revenue specication (15) or (16) and the markup specication (17) in
(14), we can write the entry conditions as
X+ lnS + N+1 < ! < X+ lnS + N ;
where we dene
   + 
!     ;
N   lnN + N (constant elasticity revenue specication)
 N + N (xed e¤ects revenue specication)
This gives rise to the following simultaneous model for revenues and the number of rms:
for N = 0: r unobserved
X+ lnS + 1 < !
for N > 0: ln r = X + N + 
X+ lnS + N+1 < ! < X+ lnS + N :
Estimation This is a simultaneous ordered probit and demand model. It has a similar
structure as in Ferrari, Verboven and Degryse (2010), although they derive it from a rather
di¤erent setting with coordinated entry. The model has the following endogeneity problem.
We want to estimate the causal e¤ect of N on r, but N is likely to be correlated with the
demand error . Econometrically, the error terms  and !      are correlated because
they contain the common component . Intuitively, rms are more likely to enter in markets
where they expect demand to be high, leading to spurious correlation between the number
of rms and total revenues per capita N  r, or a bias towards too much market expansion
and too little business stealing. Since we will use the estimated market expansion e¤ects to
obtain a proper estimate of the competition e¤ects, it is crucial that we do not overestimate
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market expansion. Fortunately, population size S serves as a natural exclusion restriction
to identify the causal e¤ect of N on r. It does not directly a¤ect per capita revenues, yet
it is correlated with N , since rms are more likely to enter and cover their xed costs in
large markets. In di¤erent contexts, Berry and Waldfogel (1999) and Ferrari, Verboven and
Degryse (2010) have used similar identication strategies.
To estimate the model by maximum likelihood, suppose that  and  are normally dis-
tributed, so that !      is also normally distributed. We then obtain the following
likelihood contributions. For markets with N = 0 we have
P (0) = 1  

X+ lnS + 1
!

;
and for markets with N > 0 we have
f(ln r)P (N j ln r) = 1






 (18)0@
0@X+ lnS + N    !=2 q
2!   2!=2
1A  
0@X+ lnS + N+1    !=2 q
2!   2!=2
1A1A ;
where  = ln r  X   N .
Constructing ETRs and percentage markup drops When the entry model is aug-
mented with revenue data, we can still compute the ETR as before. It is given by
ETR(N) = exp (N 1   N) N   1
N
:
Furthermore, it is now also possible to directly compute the percentage markup drop follow-
ing entry. Using (17), we can write this percentage markup drop as
(N   1)
(N)
= exp (N 1   N) :
To express this in terms of the estimated parameters for the xed e¤ects revenue specication,
we can substitute the denition N  N + N to obtain:
(N   1)
(N)
= exp (N 1   N) exp (  (N 1   N))
= ETR(N)
N
N   1 exp (  (N 1   N)) ; (19)
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where the second equality follows from the denition of the ETR. Similarly, for the constant
elasticity revenue equation, we can substitute the denition N   lnN + N to obtain
(N   1)
(N)
= exp (N 1   N)

N   1
N
 
= ETR(N)

N
N   1
1+
: (20)
Consistent with the discussion in Section 2, this shows for both specications how the ETRs
should be adjusted by the estimated revenue parameters to obtain an unbiased estimate for
the markup drop after entry. The simple ETRs can only be used as an unbiased measure in
the special case where
exp (  (N 1   N)) = N   1
N
;
in the exible specication, and  =  1 in the restricted specication. Intuitively, in both
cases this requires that entry only leads to business stealing and not to any market expansion.
4 Empirical analysis
We organize the discussion of the empirical analysis as follows. We rst present the dataset for
the various local service sectors. Next, we discuss the results from estimating the entry model
and the revenue model separately. This leads to the construction of traditional Bresnahan
and Reiss entry threshold ratios. They do not yet take into account the existence of market
expansion from entry, and can be used as a benchmark for our subsequent results. Finally,
we present the results for the simultaneous model of entry and demand, leading to estimates
of competition e¤ects or adjusted entry threshold ratios that take into account market
expansion e¤ects.
4.1 Dataset
We analyze seven di¤erent local service sectors: architects, bakeries, butchers, orists,
plumbers, real estate agents and restaurants. For each sector, we have constructed a cross-
sectional data set of more than 800 local markets (towns) in Belgium in 2007. The main
variables are rm revenues per capita r, the number of rms N , population size S and other
market demographics X.7
7Firm revenues and the number of rms come from V.A.T. and Business register data from the sectoral
database, set up by the Federal Public Service Economy (Sector and Market Monitoring Department).
Population size and other market demographics are census data from the FPS Economy (Statistics Belgium).
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Selection of sectors Based on our research proposal, the Belgian Federal Ministry of
Economic A¤airs made available a list of local service sectors at the 4-digit or 5-digit NACE
code for empirical analysis. From this list we rst eliminated sectors where the relevant
market is clearly not local, such as TV-production houses. Furthermore, to avoid possible
complications stemming from multi-market competition, we restricted attention to sectors
where the average number of establishments per rm is less than 3. Sectors with many chains,
such as travel agencies and clothes stores, were therefore also eliminated from the analysis.
This resulted in a list of seven local service sectors: architects, bakeries, butchers, orists,
plumbers, real estate agents and restaurants. For all these sectors the median number of
establishments per company is 1, the 75-percentile is no larger than 2 and the 90-percentile
is no larger than 5.
Geographic market denition For each sector, we dene the geographic market at the
level of the ZIP-code. This roughly corresponds to the denition of a town in Belgium, and
it is more narrow than the administrative municipality, which on average consists of about 5
towns. The market denition appears reasonable for the considered sectors, as they relate to
frequently purchased goods or to services where local information is important. The extent
of the geographic market may of course vary somewhat across sectors. Nevertheless, for
simplicity and consistency we decided to use the same market denition for all sectors. To
avoid problems with overlapping markets, we only retain the non-urban areas, i.e. towns
with a population density below 800 inhabitants per km2 and a market size lower than 15,000
inhabitants.
Construction of the variables and summary statistics The number of rms N is
the number of companies in the market, as constructed from the business registry database.
Revenues per rm and per capita r are computed at the company level from the V.A.T.
sectoral database. Ideally, we would want to use data at the establishment level but this
information is incomplete. As discussed above, we therefore focus on sectors with a low num-
ber of establishments per rm (no chains). Furthermore, we restrict attention to companies
with at most two establishments in the country.8
The data on the number of rms N and revenues r are specic to each of the seven di¤er-
ent sectors. In addition to these endogenous variables, we also observe the common variables
population size S and a vector of other market demographics X. This vector consists of the
market surface, personal income/capita, the demographic composition of the population (%
8The results of our analysis are robust when we use alternative selection criteria, e.g. retain companies
with at most ve establishments.
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women, % foreigners, % unemployed and % in various age categories), and a regional dummy
variable for Flanders. The vector X enters both the revenue and entry equation. In con-
trast, population size S only enters the entry equation and therefore serves as an exclusion
restriction for the revenue equation to identify the causal e¤ect of N on r.
Table 1 gives a complete list of the variables and their denitions, and presents basic
summary statistics for the common variables S and X, as observed for the cross-section of
835 non-urban markets. Table 2 provides more detailed summary statistics for the sector-
specic variables, revenues per rm and per capita r and the number of rms N . The top
panel shows the number of markets with 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more rms. Most sectors have
broad market coverage with a common presence of at least one rm per market. This is most
notable for restaurants, since there are only 93 markets without a restaurant. The middle
and bottom panels of Table 2 show the means and standard deviations for the number of
rms N and revenues r across markets.
4.2 Preliminary evidence
We now discuss the results from estimating the entry model and the revenue model separately.
This leads to traditional Bresnahan and Reiss entry threshold ratios. It also provides a rst
indication on the extent of market expansion (as opposed to business stealing) following
entry, yet without accounting for endogeneity of N for now.
Entry model Table 3 shows the empirical results per sector from estimating the ordered
probit entry model. Consistent with other work, population size lnS is the most important
determinant of rm entry, with a positive and highly signicant parameter for all sectors.9
Several variables of the age structure also tend to have a positive and signicant e¤ect across
sectors, in particular the %young and %old, relative to the reference group of young adults
with age between 2540 years. The e¤ect of several other variables di¤ers across sectors,
both in sign and magnitudes. For example, markets with a high income per capita tend to
have more architects, orists and real estate agents, but fewer bakeries. Generally speaking,
it is not straightforward to interpret these parameters, as the variables may capture several
e¤ects (variable prots, xed costs) and may be collinear with other variables (e.g. income
and unemployment). While the control variables are not of direct interest, it is still important
to control for them to allow for di¤erent sources of variation across markets.
The ordered probit model also includes the entry e¤ects or cut-pointsN . We transform
9Based on (11), the parameter of lnS can be interpreted as 1=, and the parameters of the other demo-
graphics as =.
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these parameters to construct the entry thresholds (for a representative market with average
characteristics) and the per rm entry threshold ratios (which are independent of the other
characteristics). This is based on the expressions (12) and (13) derived earlier.
Table 4 shows the computed entry thresholds and entry threshold ratios. To illustrate,
rst consider butchers (third column). The entry threshold, i.e. the minimum population
size to support one butcher in a town, is 1,166. It increases to 2,736 to support a second
butcher and to 4,905 to support a third butcher. The pattern is slightly disproportional, i.e.
the minimum population size to support a given number of rms increases disproportionately
with the number of rms. This is reected in the ETRs. For example, ETR(2) = 1:17, which
means that the minimum population size per rm should increase by an extra 17% to support
a second rm. Under the homogeneous goods assumption of the Bresnahan and Reiss model,
this can be interpreted as an indication that entry intensies competition between butchers.
Now consider all sectors. Table 4 shows that the ETRs for the third, fourth or fth entrant
are signicantly greater than 1 in about half of the cases, and insignicantly di¤erent from
1 in the remaining half. In the traditional Bresnahan and Reiss framework, this would
indicate mixed evidence on the competitive e¤ects of entry from the third entrant onwards.
Table 4 also shows that the ETR for the second entrant is only signicantly greater than 1
for one sector, butchers; it does not di¤er signicantly from 1 for four sectors; and it is even
signicantly less than 1 for the remaining two sectors, architects and real estate agents. The
latter nding contradicts the competition interpretation of ETRs, as it would suggest that
competition becomes weaker when a second rm enters the market. As we will show below,
an alternative interpretation is the presence of signicant market expansion when a second
rm enters the market.
Revenue model Table 5 shows the empirical results per sector from simple OLS regres-
sions of the restricted revenue specication (15), i.e. regressions of ln r on lnN and X. Since
the model is estimated with OLS, we do not yet account for the endogeneity of N so we
should be cautious at this point in drawing causal inferences on market expansion versus
business stealing from entry. First, consider the control variables X. In contrast with the
entry equation, the parameters are signicant for most variables and usually have the same
sign across the various sectors. Per capita revenues tend to be larger in markets with a low
surface area, a low personal income, a low fraction of unemployed, and a high fraction of
kids/young or old (relative to the base young adult group).
Now consider the parameter on lnN . The parameter is negative and signicant for ve
out of seven sectors, and insignicantly di¤erent from zero for the remaining two sectors
(orists and real estate agents). For the ve sectors where the parameter is negative, it is
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relatively small, varying between 0.15 and 0.39. Overall, this preliminary evidence would
suggest that additional entry implies some business stealing but more important market
expansion. This would in turn indicate that the ETRs are not a good measure of competition,
as this is only the case when entry only leads to business stealing (coe¢ cient for lnN of 
1). However, as already mentioned, we have not yet accounted for the endogeneity of N .
Firms tend to locate in markets where they expect demand to be high, leading to a spurious
correlation between the number of rms and total market demand and an overestimate of
the extent of market expansion. Our full model accounts for this, by estimating the revenue
model simultaneously with the entry model, using market size as an exclusion restriction to
identify the market expansion e¤ect.
4.3 Results from the full model
We now discuss the main empirical results, from estimating the entry and revenue model
simultaneously. We rst look at the case of butchers in detail, to give a comparison of the
di¤erent specications and methods. We then give a broader overview of all sectors, focusing
on the estimated competition e¤ects or adjusted ETRs, which take into account the market
expansion e¤ects from entry.
Comparison of di¤erent specications and methods: butchers As discussed in
section 3, we consider two specications for the revenue equation. In the constant elasticity
specication (15), the number of entrants appears logarithmically, so N =  ln(N). In the
xed e¤ects specication (16), we estimate the e¤ect of entry N on revenues for each market
conguration. For both specications, we compare the results from simultaneous estimation
of the demand and entry model with those from estimating the models separately. We
focus the comparison on the revenue equation, since the results for the entry equation are
very similar across specications and methods (and given in Table 3 for the single equation
estimation).
Table 6 shows the results. The estimated e¤ects of the control variables X are very
similar across di¤erent specications, so we do not discuss them further. Our main interest
is in the e¤ects of entry on revenues. First consider the constant elasticity specication.
When the revenue equation is estimated separately using OLS, we estimate  =  0:24 (as
already reported in Table 5). In sharp contrast, when the revenue equation is estimated
simultaneously with the entry equation, we estimate  =  0:72. Hence, accounting for the
endogeneity of N implies a considerably higher estimate of business stealing. The market
expansion elasticity, 1 + , correspondingly drops from 0.76 to 0.28. Intuitively, OLS gives
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a spurious nding of market expansion, since it does not take into account that entrants
tend to locate in markets where the unobserved demand error is high.10 Nevertheless, the
simultaneous model still implies there is some market expansion: an increase in N by 10%
tends to raise market revenues by 2.8%. The bottom part of Table 6 shows how  translates
into percentage revenue e¤ects R(N)=R(N +1). We see a declining pattern, where the e¤ect
on total revenue per capita is 21% for the second entrant, 12% for the third entrant, 8% for
the fourth entrant and 6% for the fth entrant. This smooth pattern is evidently driven by
the restricted functional form of the logarithmic specication.
Now consider the unrestricted xed e¤ects specication. We do not report the di¤erent
N , but immediately discuss the implied percentage revenue e¤ects R(N)=R(N + 1). As
before, we nd large market expansion e¤ects from single equation estimation (e.g. 85%
market expansion for the second entrant) and much lower e¤ects when we account for the
endogeneity of N (26% for the second entrant). Furthermore, the exible specication no
longer gives a smooth pattern for the entry e¤ects. Only the second butcher leads to signif-
icant market expansion. For additional entrants, the extent of market expansion becomes
insignicant.
In sum, this discussion shows that both the specication and the method are important
to correctly estimate the extent of market expansion. First, it is necessary to account for the
endogeneity of entry since otherwise the extent of market expansion will be overestimated.
Second, it may be important to consider the possibility of a exible specication for the
entry e¤ects, though this comes at the cost of reduced precision. These conclusions do not
just hold for butchers but also for the other sectors we have studied. They will therefore be
highly relevant when estimating the competition e¤ects based on the adjusted ETRs.
Competition e¤ects from entry: all sectors Table 7 shows the competition e¤ects
from additional entry, as estimated from the simultaneous entry and revenue model. As is
clear from (19) and (20), the competition e¤ects can be interpreted as adjusted ETRs: they
adjust the traditional ETRs for the extent of market expansion induced by entry. Only if
market expansion is small, the competition e¤ects will be close to the traditional ETRs.
The top panel of Table 7 shows the results for the constant elasticity revenue specication.
The rst row shows the estimated business stealing e¤ects  from the revenue equation. For
six out of seven sectors, the estimates are much closer to -1 than in the earlier OLS estimates
10More formally, the simultaneous model di¤ers from the single equation model because it accounts for
the correlation between the demand and prot error. Table 5 shows that ! =  0:43, which is negative
as expected because the structural error in the entry equation contains the structural error in the demand
equation.
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of Table 5. This means that the necessary adjustments of the ETRs are much smaller as earlier
suggested. Nevertheless, the market expansion elasticity 1+ is still important, varying from
0.08 for bakeries to 0.72 for orists.11
Based on (20), we can use the s and the ETRs (very similar to those in Table 4) to com-
pute the markup e¤ects or adjusted ETRs. For most sectors and market congurations we
nd signicant competition e¤ects from entry. The adjusted ETRs are typically signicantly
greater than 1, also for entry by the second rm, and they are never signicantly below 1.
For example, entry by a second restaurant reduces markups by 17% ((1)=(2) = 1:17).
This contrasts with our earlier estimated simple ETRs, which were often signicantly less
than 1 for the second entrant (e.g. ETR(2) = 0:87 for restaurants). The reason is, of course,
that we now adjust for the extent of market expansion. Bakeries are the only sector without
signicant competition e¤ects from entry in the constant elasticity specication. We already
found the traditional ETRs to be close to 1 in this sector. Moreover, it turns out that entry
by bakeries largely entails business stealing ( =  0:92), so that the adjusted ETRs remain
close to and not signicantly di¤erent from 1.
The bottom panel of Table 7 shows whether these conclusions are conrmed using the
more exible xed e¤ects revenue specication. The estimated competition e¤ects of the
second entrant are broadly similar. In ve out of seven sectors, the second entrant has a
signicant e¤ect on competition. The two exceptions are bakeries (as before) and real es-
tate agents where (1)=(2) does not di¤er signicantly from 1. However, the conclusions
regarding competition from the third, fourth or fth entrant are di¤erent from the restricted
specication. With the exception of restaurants, we no longer estimate signicant competi-
tion e¤ects from the third entrant onwards. Note, however, that the standard errors of the
estimated (N   1)=(N) have become larger (because of the increased exibility), so that
the competition tests have less power.
Combining the results from the restricted constant elasticity specication (with more
precise estimates) and the more exible xed e¤ects specication (with larger standard er-
rors), we conclude that in most sectors the second entrant appears to reduce markups by
at least 30%, whereas further entrants may not necessarily promote competition further.
Bakeries and real estate agents are exceptions to this conclusion. For real estate agents,
the xed e¤ects specication does not estimate signicant competition e¤ects from the sec-
ond entrant, though the standard errors are rather large here.12 For bakeries, the lack of
11Only for real estate agents  is not signicant. This suggests considerable market expansion, perhaps
capturing that market denition is broader than the town level for this sector.
12A lack of competition e¤ects from entry in the real estate sector is consistent with the common practice
of more or less uniform percentage commissions. This has also been documented elsewhere, for example
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competition e¤ects appears more strongly: both the constant elasticity and the xed e¤ects
specication indicate that the second entrant does not promote competition. Incidentally,
this is consistent with a recent decision by the Belgian Council of Competition. In January
2008, the Council convicted the Association of Bakeries for continuing its price xing policies
after prices for bread had been liberalized in 2006.
5 Conclusions
We have proposed a methodology for estimating the competition e¤ects from entry in dif-
ferentiated products markets, and illustrated how to implement it using datasets for seven
di¤erent local service sectors. We started from Bresnahan and ReissETRs, and provided
conditions under which they can be used as a test for the presence and a measure for the
magnitude of competition e¤ects from entry. We subsequently showed how to augment the
traditional entry model with a revenue equation. This revenue equation serves to adjust the
traditional ETRs by the extent of market expansion due to entry, leading to an unbiased
estimate of the competition e¤ects from entry.
Our empirical results show that traditional ETRs are close to one, suggesting limited
competition e¤ects, and in some cases even signicantly below 1, suggesting entry would
reduce competition. Furthermore, we nd that entry leads to signicant market expansion,
which implies that the traditional ETRs underestimate the e¤ects of entry on competition.
Accounting for the estimated market expansion, we no longer nd adjusted ETRs that are
signicantly below 1. In most sectors, the second entrant reduces markups by at least 30%,
whereas the third or higher entrants have smaller or insignicant e¤ects. In at least one
sector, bakeries, we have found that even the second entrant does not create competition,
which is consistent with a recent decision by the competition authority.
Our empirical analysis stressed the importance of several specic issues that should be
taken into account. First, it is important to account for the endogeneity of the number of
entrants in estimating market expansion e¤ects from entry. Failure to do so would result in
an overestimate of market expansion e¤ects, and hence an overestimate of the competition
e¤ects (adjusted ETRs), as opposed to an underestimate from the traditional ETRs. In our
setting, population size arises as a natural instrument, and we found the bias from ignoring
the endogeneity issue can be substantial.
Second, it is potentially important to consider a exible revenue specication to estimate
the market expansion e¤ects. Our restricted constant elasticity specication (with lnN)
imposes market expansion e¤ects to be declining in N , whereas our more exible xed e¤ects
Hsieh and Moretti (2003), who draw implications for the e¢ ciency of entry.
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specication allows the e¤ects to vary per consecutive entrant. The exible specication
suggested that the main market expansion e¤ects (and hence required adjustment to the
ETRs) come from the second entrant, and less so from the additional entrants. However, this
specication also entails less precise parameter estimates. Future research would be desirable
to shed further light on this. For example, one may collect more data, or use alternative
specications with more structure from a specic model of product di¤erentiation.
Due to the relative simplicity of our methodology, it was possible to consider quite a
number of di¤erent local service sectors. Nevertheless, more work on di¤erent sectors and
di¤erent countries would be useful to further evaluate the benets and limitations of our
approach. We hope the increased availability of revenue data at the detailed company level
will stimulate such research.
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Table 1: Denition of variables
Name Denition Mean St. Dev.
N Number of rms with at least one establishment See Table 2
r Revenues per rm and per capita (in e) See Table 2
S Population size or number of inhabitants (in 1,000) 4.53 3.89
Surface logarithm of surface area (in km2) 2.71 2.76
GDP GDP per capita (in 1,000 Euro) 11.15 2.03
%women Percentage of women .506 .013
%foreigners Percentage of foreigners .043 .057
%unemployed Percentage unemployed .057 .028
%kid Percentage under age of 10 years .121 .018
%young Percentage between age of 10 and 25 years .187 .019
%adult Percentage between age of 40 and 65 years .323 .027
%old Percentage over age of 65 .163 .028
Flanders Dummy variable equal to 1 for market in Flanders .398 .490
Notes: The number of observations (markets) is 835. The number of rms N and revenues
per rm r are constructed from V.A.T. and Business register data from the sectoral database,
set up by the Federal Public Service Economy (Sector and market Monitoring Department). The
demographics are census data from the FPS Economy (Statistics Belgium), except for %unemployed
which comes from Ecodata.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for number of rms and rm revenues
Sector Archit. Baker. Butch. Florists Plumb. Real Est. Restaur.
NACE code 7111 1071 4722 47761 4322 6831 5610
Number of markets with
N = 0 144 242 236 260 139 278 93
N = 1 83 148 169 147 112 106 74
N = 2 76 126 122 130 94 95 65
N = 3 79 94 97 85 68 57 57
N = 4 68 63 71 62 68 56 37
N = 5 39 41 39 44 43 26 37
N > 5 337 111 93 94 303 168 472
Number of rms (sample of all markets)
mean 6.2 2.5 2.4 2.3 5.1 3.4 11.1
st.dev 7.0 2.8 2.7 2.6 5.1 5.6 12.3
Revenues per rm (sample of markets with N > 0)
mean 27.79 65.56 82.09 51.96 108.26 31.68 64.18
st.dev 51.98 76.70 117.8 106.14 231.3 63.32 132.5
Notes: The number of observations (markets) is 835.
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Table 3: Ordered probit entry model
Archit. Baker. Butch. Florists Plumb. Real Est. Restaur.
Ordered probit entry model (sample of all markets)
lnS 1.40* 1.62* 1.21 1.29* 1.34* 1.35* 1.48*
Surface 0.12 -0.04 0.10 0.06 0.15 -0.09 0.24*
GDP 2.63* -0.73* -0.48 0.81* 0.59 2.11* -0.28
%women 9.27* -8.58* -0.16 -2.16 -3.57 -0.40 3.63
%foreigners -0.91 -2.08* -2.53 0.18 -1.59 0.40 -0.04
%unemployed -4.18* -2.85 -2.45 -2.36 -2.85 -6.34* 4.95*
%kid 7.41* 0.02 -6.69 -7.07 2.44 12.99* 1.29
%young 11.49* 6.99* 7.99 0.01 1.55 13.20* 9.05*
%adult 2.69 -3.13 -3.75 -7.93* -0.27 7.55* 9.50*
%old 4.79* 10.57* 7.70 -1.87 -0.10 13.06* 7.08*
Flanders -0.49* 0.01 0.28 0.04 -0.05 -0.28 0.59*
N yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.25 0.29 0.26 .27 0.24 0.25 0.25
Notes: The parameter estimates are based on maximum likelihood estimation of the ordered
probit model (11), where the parameters are all multiplied by the standard deviation . Hence,
the parameter of lnS can be interpreted as 1=, and the parameters of the other demographics as
=. A *indicates that the parameter di¤ers signicantly from 0 at the 5% level.
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Table 4: Entry thresholds and entry threshold ratios
Archit. Baker. Butch. Florists Plumb. Real Est. Restaur.
Entry thresholds
ET (1) 692 1387 1166 1405 650 1699 445
ET (2) 1137 2610 2736 2873 1251 2818 773
ET (3) 1706 4326 4905 5198 2041 4458 1132
ET (4) 2527 6446 8027 7864 2845 5896 1572
ET (5) 3542 8656 12360 11171 3979 7852 1924
Entry threshold ratios
ETR(2) 0.82* 0.94 1.17* 1.02 0.96 0.83* 0.87
ETR(3) 1.00 1.11* 1.20* 1.21* 1.09 1.06 0.98
ETR(4) 1.11* 1.12* 1.23* 1.14* 1.05 0.99 1.04
ETR(5) 1.12* 1.07 1.23* 1.14* 1.12* 1.07 0.98
Notes: The entry thresholds (ET) are based on the cut-points N and the other parameter
estimates of Table 3, using expression (12) evaluated at the sample means of the variables. The
entry threshold ratios (ETR) are based on the cut-points N , using expression (13). All ETs are
signicant with standard errors varying around 150. For the ETRs, a *indicates that the ETR
di¤ers signicantly from 1.
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Table 5: Preliminary regressions for the revenue equation
Archit. Baker. Butch. Florists Plumb. Real Est. Restaur.
OLS revenue model (sample of markets with N > 0)
Constant 3.82 11.89* 18.05* 19.57* 16.34* 5.20 11.20*
lnN -0.15* -0.39* -0.24* -0.02 -0.15* 0.10 -0.25*
Surface -0.57* -0.36 -0.53* -0.43* -0.50* -0.52* -0.45*
GDP -0.24 -0.69* -0.86* -0.75 -1.23* 0.05 -0.81*
%women -3.10 -9.97* -15.23* -15.6* -11.09* -11.16 -10.28*
%foreigners -1.81* -0.76 -1.50* -1.89 -1.09 -1.20 -1.48*
%unemployed -8.74* -5.95* -9.66* -7.70* -5.61* -4.19 -5.09*
%kid 13.71* 6.48 7.10 5.53 11.48* 17.80* 10.24*
%young 7.78* 11.63* 6.34* 2.78 13.62* 1.33 11.61*
%adult 1.68 2.95 1.23 -4.03 3.91 2.75 6.81*
%old 10.72* 8.95* 11.42* 3.02 9.76* 6.90 10.45*
Flanders -0.51* -0.28* -0.53* -0.16 -0.12 -0.19 -0.24*
R2 .33 .33 .37 .13 .27 .09 .40
Notes: The parameter estimates are based on OLS estimation of the restricted revenue speci-
cation (15). A *indicates that the parameter di¤ers signicantly from 0 at the 5% level.
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Table 6: Detailed estimation results for the revenue equation: illustration with butchers
Constant elasticity model Fixed e¤ects model
Single equation Simultaneous Single equation Simultaneous
Constant 18.05* (2.94) 9.76 (3.40)  
lnN () -0.24* (0.06) -0.72* (0.09) (xed e¤ects) (xed e¤ects)
Surface -0.53* (0.05) -0.18 (0.07) -0.54* (0.05) -0.02 (0.08)
GDP -0.86* (0.28) -0.30 (0.36) -0.89* (0.28) -0.12 (0.40)
%women -15.23* (3.83) -6.78 (3.83) -15.35* (3.85) -3.15 (4.24)
%foreigners -1.50* (0.71) -1.17 (0.88) -1.56* (0.72) -1.15 (0.97)
%unemployed -9.66* (1.87) -7.81* (2.19) -9.63* (1.88) -7.12* (2.42)
%kid 7.10 (3.68) -0.16 (4.11) 7.41* (3.70) -3.09 (4.49)
%young 6.34* (2.67) 5.47 (2.83) 6.51* (2.69) 5.01 (3.12)
%adult 1.23 (2.47) -1.72 (3.14) 1.30 (2.48) -2.99 (3.40)
%old 11.42* (2.22) 9.53* (2.41) 11.38* (2.23) 8.48* (2.61)
Flanders -0.53* (0.11) -0.14 (0.14) -0.53* (0.12) 0.06 (0.16)
! 0 () -0.43* (0.06) 0 () -0.60 (0.08)
R(2)=R(1) 1.78* (0.10) 1.21* (0.07) 1.85* (0.20) 1.26* (0.13)
R(3)=R(2) 1.40* (0.05) 1.12* (0.04) 1.38* (0.18) 1.05 (0.13)
R(4)=R(3) 1.27* (0.03) 1.08* (0.03) 1.29 (0.19) 1.00 (0.14)
R(5)=R(4) 1.20* (0.02) 1.06* (0.02) 1.04 (0.24) 0.82 (0.17)
Notes: Both the single equation and the simultaneous equation models are estimated by max-
imum likelihood of the full model (18). The single equation models are the special case in which
we set 2!= 0, reducing to the earlier ordered probit entry equation and OLS revenue equation.
In the restricted constant elasticity model, N enters the revenue equation through lnN , in the
exible xed e¤ects model it enters through a set of xed e¤ects N . Parameter estimates and
standard errors (in parentheses) are only shown for the revenue equation. For the entry equation,
they are very similar to the single equation ordered probit results of Table 3. A *indicates that
the parameter di¤ers signicantly from 0 at the 5% level.
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Table 7: Markup e¤ects or adjusted entry threshold ratios
Archit. Bakeries Butchers Florists Plumbers Real Est. Restaur.
constant elasticity model
 -0.48* -0.92* -0.72* -0.28* -0.53* 0.07 -0.53*
(0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05)
(1)=(2) 1.20* 1.02 1.42* 1.57* 1.35* 1.70* 1.17*
(0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.16) (0.10) (0.14) (0.07)
(2)=(3) 1.24* 1.17* 1.33* 1.58* 1.32* 1.58* 1.22*
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06)
(3)=(4) 1.26* 1.14* 1.28* 1.37* 1.19* 1.33* 1.21*
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
(4)=(5) 1.22* 1.07 1.24* 1.31* 1.23* 1.34* 1.08*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
xed e¤ects model
(1)=(2) 2.01* 1.19 1.53* 1.73* 1.82* 1.31 1.35*
(0.19) (0.11) (0.16) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.13)
(2)=(3) 0.99 1.21 1.25 1.40 1.25 0.98 1.40*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.22) (0.18) (0.22) (0.16)
(3)=(4) 1.14 1.13 1.21 1.24 1.08 1.55 1.15
(0.14) (0.12) (0.17) (0.23) (0.17) (0.38) (0.19)
(4)=(5) 1.09 0.98 1.01 1.02 1.63* 1.75 0.92
(0.17) (0.13) (0.21) (0.22) (0.29) (0.55) (0.17)
Notes: The markup e¤ects (N   1)=(N) are computed from (20) for the restricted constant
elasticity revenue equation, and from (19) for the more exible xed e¤ects revenue specication.
For the constant elasticity specication, Table 7 also shows the business stealing e¤ect , used to
adjust the ETR. A *indicates that the markup e¤ect di¤ers signicantly from 1.
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